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Abstract. Avoiding cash taxes can serve as a significant source of additional cash flows for firms, though 
how managers utilize these funds and the resulting consequences remain open empirical questions. We 
provide answers by examining the association between the amount of cash tax savings and two uses of 
cash – investment and dividend payout – for an international sample of firms. We find that firms are more 
likely to invest cash tax savings rather than distribute them in the form of dividends and that this results in 
inefficient overinvestment. We find that our results hold for an international sample of domestic-only 
firms, distinguishing our study from US-only studies, which focus on constraints and distortions of 
multinational corporations in a worldwide tax system. We find nuanced results when partitioning on 
country-level governance. Our results suggest cash tax avoidance has real effects on firm decisions, 
namely investment and payout policies, and this effect varies based on the country in which the firm 
operates.  
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How Do Firms Use Cash Tax Savings? A Cross-country Analysis 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine how firms utilize cash generated via tax avoidance. Some of the most 
important economic and financial decisions facing management and the firm involve the creation, 
management, and use of cash. Relatedly, income taxes, paid as a percentage of pre-tax profits, are often 
one of the larger outflows of cash, and thus, the reduction of income taxes paid could serve as an 
important source of cash. Recent studies find that firms are successful at avoiding cash taxes (Dyreng, et 
al. 2008) and that tax avoidance (e.g., tax savings) is associated with greater cash flows and cash holdings 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011, Hanlon et al. 2017). Therefore, to the extent that effective tax planning reduces the 
amount of cash taxes paid, cash tax savings may act as an important source of cash, which can have a 
significant effect on the firm’s cash management policy. However, the real impact that cash tax savings 
has on the uses of cash remains an open empirical question.1 
To study our research question, we use an international sample and focus our examination on the 
effect that an increase in cash tax savings has on the following real activities: cash holdings, investment, 
investment efficiency, and dividend payout policies. We focus on these activities due to data availability 
for the international sample.2 Prior research has used the globally-unique setting3 of US-domiciled 
multinational firms to test the effect that greater transaction costs associated with the US worldwide tax 
system has on a subset of real activities. For example, Hanlon et al.(2015) and Edwards et al. (2016a) 
provide evidence that multinational firms are more likely to use locked-out cash due to repatriation costs 
to acquire foreign corporations overseas. Similarly, Nessa (2017) provides evidence that repatriation tax 
costs reduce the amount of cash US multinationals distribute to shareholders in the form of dividends. 
                                                            
1 We note concurrent research by Guenther et al. (2017). Specifically, Guenter et al. (2017) use a US-only sample of 
multinational and domestic firms to examine the effect of cash tax avoidance on the level of real investment. (e.g., 
CapEx) and how that effect varies for financially-constrained firms.  
2 We note that we lack detailed loan data for the broad international sample and thus do not perform tests regarding 
the use of cash tax savings to pay off loans. 
3 Relative to territorial tax systems, worldwide tax systems are relatively scare. For example, during 2017, twenty-
six OECD nations had territorial tax systems, while eight (including the United States) have worldwide tax systems. 
With the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2018, the US’s tax system shifts closer to a territorial system and 
away from a worldwide system.   
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To ensure that our results are not a subset of the extant US-based studies that focus on the cross-
border distortions of multinational corporations, we perform all tests using two samples, a sample that 
includes all observations with available data and a reduced sample that removes firms with foreign 
operations and thus includes only domestic standalone entities (i.e., domestic-only firms).4 Using the full 
sample shows the overall generalizability of our results. In contrast, using the reduced sample ensures the 
contribution of our study is incremental to that of prior studies. In addition, because domestic-only firms’ 
tax payments are the same whether the firm operates under a worldwide or territorial tax system, through 
this reduced sample we are better able to measure cash tax savings because these savings are unaffected 
by differences in characteristics and uses between domestic and foreign cash holdings (Hartford 1999). 
In pooled OLS regressions5, we find that greater cash tax savings are associated with increases in 
current year cash balances, but not future cash balances, which contrasts with US-based studies that 
suggest that firms hold on to cash for precautionary reasons (Hanlon et al. 2017). Moreover, we find that 
cash tax savings is associated with greater investment, lower investment efficiency (particularly, 
overinvestment), and lower dividend payout. We consider the economic significance of our results. For 
example, in the domestic-only sample, we find that a one dollar increase in tax savings is associated with 
a 16-cent increase in current cash holdings, an 11 cent increase in next year’s cash holdings, 15 cent 
increase in investment, and a six cent decrease in dividends. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide 
such evidence using a large sample of international firms.  
Next, we exploit our international sample and explore whether firms’ use of cash tax savings 
varies across countries. Prior research has shown that the construct governance is of importance for firm 
financing, investment efficiency, and signaling (e.g., Jensen 1986, Harford 1999, Dittmar et al. 2003, 
Dechow et al. 2008). In addition, prior literature has also found that differences across countries explain 
much more of the variation in governance and disclosure than do differences across firms (Doidge et al. 
                                                            
4 For completeness, we also run our analyses and report the results using the larger international sample of both 
multinational and domestic firms.  
5 We argue that cash tax savings may result in firm-level changes to investment and payout policies that are additive 
or subtractive to differences in pure cash flows. For this reason, we opt to use a traditional OLS regression model to 
capture the effect, as opposed to the cash flow model used by Guenther et al. (2017). 
3 
 
2007) and that agency problems and their effects are more prominent outside the US (Desai et al.2007, 
Blaylock 2016). This implies that governance and its effects may be a meaningful point of variation in our 
cross-country setting. Therefore, we test the effect of country-level governance on our main findings. 
To do so, we use a country-level measure of governance, the Governance Index, from Bushman 
et al. (2004), which captures firm-level governance transparency within countries. We find that firms 
located in countries with weak governance have larger dividend payouts while also underinvesting, 
consistent with firms located in weak governance countries removing cash from the firm. 
We also rely on findings from the prior literature to motivate additional analyses including: an 
investigation of the effect of cash tax savings on three subtypes of investment, an investigation of the 
effect of cash tax savings on a proxy for share repurchases, and an investigation of the effect of 
exogenous changes in statutory corporate tax rates. We also perform an extensive array of robustness 
checks. In general, results from these tests support our earlier test results. 
Our research question and analyses rely on the belief that cash tax savings are a meaningful and 
unique source of funds; we argue this is the case for several reasons. First, cash tax savings may be large 
in nature. Throughout the world taxes are levied and paid based upon a percentage of taxable profits, 
ranging from a country-level mean of 15.2 percent to 39.8 percent of pre-tax profits for our sample.6 
Second, firm management may find cash tax savings attractive relative to other cash-saving strategies as 
efforts aimed at reducing the amount of cash taxes paid may be less likely to negatively impact current 
operations or future profitability. For example, instead of minimizing cash taxes paid as a source of funds, 
management might gain access to additional cash flows by aggressively reducing current period expenses 
such as research and development, capital replacement, or personnel expenses. These decisions, however, 
will likely lead to significant operational problems in the near-term and lower profitability in the long-
term (Edwards et al. 2016b; Guenther et al. 2017).  
                                                            
6 Even at 15 percent, taxes paid has the potential to be one of the largest cash outflows facing the firm and thus the 
savings incurred from avoiding even a portion of that can be significant. 
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Moreover, cash generated through cash tax savings is likely distinct from other potential 
financing sources for numerous reasons.  First, there is evidence to suggest that not all cash is equal as the 
source of cash may affect its persistence and value (Dechow et al. 2008). This suggests that cash 
generated via tax savings may be distinct from cash generated via other means and, therefore, the use of 
that cash may also be different. For example, cash generated via tax savings may be subject to greater 
uncertainty (Hanlon et al. 2017). To the extent that tax planning activities are related to greater 
uncertainty and to the extent that firms hold on to cash to deal with that uncertainty, firms may be less 
likely to distribute that cash and prefer instead to retain it, either as liquid cash, or less liquid investment. 
In addition, the characteristics of tax avoiding firms may also affect how related cash flows are 
used. For example, prior studies show that tax avoidance may be associated with firm governance/agency 
problems (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Desai et al.2007) and information opacity (Balakrishnan et al. 
2017, Kerr 2018).  A large literature in finance shows that information asymmetry between management 
and outsiders as well as governance and agency problems lead firms to undertake suboptimal levels of 
investment (see Hubbard 1998 and Stein 2003 for a review of these studies).  Therefore, firms with 
significant cash tax savings may be more likely to engage in investment policies which are inefficient, 
resulting in empire building and/or the expropriation of shareholder wealth. 
Our study is most closely related to Edwards et al.(2016b) and concurrent research by Guenther et 
al. (2017), both of which examine firms’ use of cash savings within the context of constraints. Edwards et 
al. (2016) find the firms’ cash tax savings are positively associated with firms’ level of investment.7 
Guenther et al. (2017) compare how cash tax savings are used relative to other cash flow sources and find 
that financially constrained firms are more likely to use cash tax savings to fund real investment. Because 
we use an international sample of firms, our focus is broader than these previous studies that focus on a 
US-only sample of multinational and/or domestic firms. A unique characteristic of our study is our ability 
to test differences that may arise due to variation at the country-level, such as governance and tax rate 
                                                            
7 These results are reported in an online appendix, as the authors’ primary question relates to the association between 
financial constraints and cash tax savings.  
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changes. To the extent that governance, tax avoidance, and investment policies are interrelated, and to the 
extent that meaningful variation in governance occurs at the country-level (Doidge et al. 2006), our study 
aims to provide better understanding of how firms’ use cash tax savings. 
Our study offers several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the stream of 
literature that examines the consequences of tax avoidance (e.g., Rego and Hutchens 2015, Hanlon et al. 
2017) and respond to observation made in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p.148) that “few studies in 
accounting test the effect of taxes on investment.” In particular, we provide evidence that firms’ cash tax 
savings activities have an effect on the real activities of the firm, specifically on investment, investment 
efficiency, and payout policies. In particular, we provide evidence that the real effects of cash tax savings 
are incremental to and distinct from the effects of non-tax-savings cash sources. In addition, we use a 
broad, large-sample international setting, one which is under-investigated in a literature which is 
dominated by US-only studies. In addition, and in contrast to Hanlon et al. (2017), who use a US-only 
setting, our results suggest that firms in other countries continue to invest and indeed, overinvest, cash tax 
savings (in lieu of holding onto cash tax savings to satisfy future tax-related claims). 
We also contribute to the literature on tax avoidance and managerial opportunism by providing 
evidence that the effect on overinvestment and dividend payout varies based upon country-level 
governance. In doing so, we help to reconcile the conflicting results between Desai et al. (2007) and 
Blaylock (2016). Accordingly, our results suggest that studies examining the governance view of tax 
avoidance should consider the role of country-level governance in addition to firm-level governance. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our research question and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes our research methodology. Section 4 describes our sample 
selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents our main empirical findings. Section 6 presents 
additional analyses and Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings  
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Our research focuses on firms’ use of cash tax savings to fund investment or payout decisions. In 
a study of the association between cash tax savings and financial constraints, Edwards et al. (2016b) 
provide evidence that the firms’ cash tax savings are positively associated with firms’ level of investment. 
Our study is also related to concurrent research by Guenther et al. (2017), who use a US-domiciled 
sample of multinational and domestic firms, to investigate how firms use cash tax savings in the face of 
financial constraints.  
Similar to those studies, we argue that cash tax savings generated via tax avoidance can be a 
meaningful source of cash flows that can be used to fund real decisions, namely the investment or payout 
decision.  The pecking order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), suggests that firms prioritize 
their sources of financing, preferring internal financing sources to external financing sources. This 
preferential order arises because, when the prospects or risks of a firm cannot be verified by outsiders, 
potential investors face the risk of adverse selection and thus demand discounts on new securities. This 
asymmetric information leads firms to prioritize their sources of financing to minimize these costs when 
funding new projects such that firms prefer internal financing over other forms of financing (e.g., equity, 
bonds, and loans) as it imposes no asymmetric information costs. 
 One potentially important internal source of financing is cash tax planning as managers 
implement strategies to reduce taxes paid. Relying on the pecking order theory, we hypothesize that, all 
else equal, cash tax savings will result in cheaper funds available for investment purposes as cash tax 
savings generate additional internal funds and reduce the overall cost of capital. Generating cash via tax 
planning may be an attractive source of internal financing because, unlike other cost-cutting techniques, 
i.e., reducing research and development or advertising expenditures, reducing firms’ taxes paid is less 
likely to negatively affect the firm’s operations.  This is highlighted in Edwards et al. (2016b), which 
provides evidence that financially constrained firms may rely on cash tax planning to generate additional 
funds because external financing sources are costlier and more difficult to acquire for these firms.  
We also explore whether firms distribute cash tax savings in the form of dividends. Existing 
theories offer two competing arguments, and thus we do not make a directional prediction. Agency theory 
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predicts that firms pay dividends to reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flows (Jensen 
1986). Specifically, distributing the cash to shareholders prevents managers from investing in low net 
present value projects or wasting funds on perquisites.  Thus, managers may prefer to distribute cash tax 
savings to investors to signal that they are not engaging in opportunistic cash tax avoidance, resulting in 
cash tax savings being positively associated with dividend payout. Alternatively, because external funds 
are more costly than internal funds, firms may be less likely to distribute cash tax savings as dividends if 
they have positive net present value projects available (Myers and Majluf 1984, Fama and French 2001). 
Under this scenario, greater cash tax savings would be negatively associated with dividend payout as it 
would be used to fund investment instead. 
At this juncture it is also important to note the tension provided by Hanlon et al. (2017) to our 
research questions. Specifically, Hanlon et al. (2017) find evidence that US firms may hold onto cash to 
satisfy future claims by US tax authorities on aggressive tax positions.  Because greater cash tax savings 
are likely associated with a greater incidence and amount of future claims by taxing authorities, this 
implies that cash made available through tax avoidance activities may be treated differently and thus 
unavailable for investment or payout purposes. If firms worldwide hold cash for precautionary reasons 
(Opler et al. 1999), we would observe an association between cash tax savings and cash levels but fail to 
observe a subsequent association between cash tax savings and investment or dividend payouts. 
2.1.1. Investment Efficiency and Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings 
After investigating the impact of cash tax savings on investment levels, we examine its effect on 
investment efficiency.  We do so because prior literature has shown that firms may deviate from optimal 
investment policies when additional funds are available and when principal-agent incentives diverge 
(Biddle et al.2009). This would be of importance for cash generated via tax savings as tax avoidance 
relies on opacity (Kerr 2018) and can be complementary to rent extraction (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), 
both of which are indicative of greater principal-agent conflicts. 
Furthermore, to the extent that firms have additional cash flows from tax avoidance, managers’ 
willingness to overinvest, in particular, may be driven by the unique aspects of tax-related class flows. 
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For example, the prior literature suggests that corporate tax avoidance is associated with greater corporate 
opacity because opacity allows firms to conceal the specific mechanisms used to avoid taxes 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2017). In addition, Biddle et al. (2009) suggest that lower transparency reduces 
overall investment efficiency. 
However, it is important to note that the ultimate effect of greater cash tax savings on investment 
efficiency likely depends on the firm’s prior level of investment efficiency.  For example, if, ex ante, the 
firm is at an inefficient level of investment due to underinvestment, then the greater investment induced 
by cash tax savings could result in more efficient levels of investment.  In contrast, if the firm is at a level 
of either efficient or overinvestment, then the greater investment would result in lower investment 
efficiency.  Therefore, we are, ex ante, unable to make a prediction regarding the association between 
cash tax savings and investment efficiency. 
2.2. Country-Level Governance and Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings 
Prior studies also suggest that governance is an important factor in a firm’s investment efficiency 
and payout decisions (i.e., La Porta et al. 2000, Dittmar et al. 2003). To this end, we follow prior literature 
and include a measure of firm-level governance in all regressions. However, Doidge et al. (2007) show 
that differences across countries explain much more of the variation in governance and disclosure than do 
differences across firms, suggesting that the effect of country-level governance is an important factor. We 
note, however, that the single-country focus of the extant studies does not allow them to test this effect. 
Thus, we examine whether the use of cash tax savings is affected by country-level governance. 
For these tests we focus on the firm’s degree of over- or under-investment (Biddle et al. 2009). 
While we expect that differences in country-level level governance will be associated with investment 
efficiency, it is ambiguous whether the effect will result in over- or under-investment. For example, in 
weak-governance countries, weak-shareholder protections may allow managers to use the cash tax 
savings to engage in more empire-building (see Jensen 1986) and thus more overinvestment. 
Alternatively, in weak-governance countries, managers may be more likely to remove cash tax 
savings from the firms due to weak-shareholder protections, thus leaving less cash to invest. This 
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argument is supported by Dhaliwal et al. (2011), which find that weakly-governed firms that engage in 
greater tax avoidance have lower cash balances. This suggests that managers use tax avoidance to extract 
cash tax savings when firm-level governance is weak. 
For dividend payout decisions, the effect is similarly ambiguous. La Porta et al. (2000) present 
two contrasting views on the association between country-level governance and dividend payouts. The 
first view suggests that dividends are an outcome of the legal protection of shareholders. This view 
suggests that shareholders in weak-governance countries lack the legal powers to force companies to 
distribute cash, and thus, we would expect firms in low-governance countries to be less likely to use cash 
tax savings to pay dividends. 
The alternative view, also presented in La Porta et al. (2000), suggests that dividends provide a 
substitute for the legal protection of shareholders. Thus, under this view, we would expect firms in weak-
governance countries to be more likely to use cash tax savings to pay dividends in order to build a 
reputation for the fair treatment of shareholders. Following Desai and Dharmapala (2006), which show 
that tax avoidance and rent extraction are complementary, dividends may act as an important signal to 
investors that management is not using tax avoidance to extract rents from the firm.  For example, 
Blaylock (2016) finds, for a sample of US firms, that greater tax avoidance is associated with fewer 
payouts to shareholders (regardless of firm-level governance). These results may be due to the fact that 
US shareholders already enjoy relatively strong legal protections; therefore, it is not as critical for those 
firms to distribute cash tax savings in the form of dividends in order to establish a reputation for the fair 
treatment of shareholders. How this association varies with country-level governance, however, is 
unknown. 
Finally, within the tax literature, a firm’s investment and dividend policies have been used as 
proxies for managerial opportunism in order to test the governance view of tax avoidance. The 
governance view of tax avoidance suggests that aggressive tax avoidance facilitates managerial 
opportunism by obfuscating the underlying purpose of the transaction, thus allowing managers to extract 
rents (i.e., cash and other personal benefits) from the firm (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Desai et al. 
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2007). Desai et al. (2007) find empirical support for this theory using a Russian setting.8  However, 
Blaylock (2016) fails to find empirical support for this theory in a US setting; specifically, he fails to find 
that firm-level governance affects the relationship between tax avoidance and firms’ investment and 
payout decisions. This suggests that the discrepancy between the two studies’ findings may be due to the 
differences in the country-level governance environments of the US and Russia. Although the goal of our 
study is not to evaluate the validity of the agency cost view of tax avoidance per se, the results of tests 
using country-level governance may also help to provide evidence to reconcile the findings within the 
extant literature which are otherwise at odds with each other. 
3. Research Methodology  
3.1. Measuring Cash Tax Savings 
We calculate the amount of cash tax savings by firm-year as the amount of actual cash taxes paid 
benchmarked against the amount of cash taxes expected to be paid. We calculate the amount of cash taxes 
expected to be paid by multiplying a firm’s pre-tax income by its country’s enacted corporate statutory 
tax rate.9 To eliminate the effect of differences in scale, we then divide that difference by firm-level pre-
tax income. This results in the following estimation equation: 
CTSi,t = ([CSTRc,t * PTIi,t] – CashTaxPaidi,t) / PTIi,t                                           (1a)      
  
In Equation (1a), CTSi,t is the amount of firm-level cash tax savings, CSTRc,t is the country-level 
enacted corporate statutory tax rate, PTIi,t is firm-level pre-tax income, and CashTaxPaidi,t is the firm-
level cash taxes paid (where subscripts c, i, and t denote country, firm, and year, respectively). An 
algebraic reordering of terms (first by dividing through and then by canceling terms) results in the 
following series of equations. 
CTSi,t = (CSTRc,t * PTIi,t / PTIi,t ) – (CashTaxPaidi,t / PTIi,t)                                  (1b)      
                                                            
8 Desai et al. (2007) do not specifically test the association between tax avoidance and investment or dividend 
payouts. Rather, they look at the stock market reaction around the announcement of more aggressive tax 
enforcement by the Russian government after the election of Vladimir Putin.  
9 Our results remain unchanged using ten alternative benchmarks.  See the robustness section for details. 
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CTSi,t = CSTRc,t – (CashTaxPaidi,t / PTIi,t)                                                             (1c)      
 
The second term in Equation (1c) is commonly referred to as the cash effective tax rate, cash 
ETR, or CETR.10 Furthermore, subtracting the CETR from a country’s enacted statutory rate for the year 
is similar to the benchmarking done in prior international tax studies such as Amiram et al. (2017) and 
Kerr (2018) and reflects the cash ETR spread. We use Equation (1c) to calculate our measure of cash tax 
savings (CTS).  
3.2. Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings 
We begin by investigating the relationship between a firm’s cash tax savings and its cash 
balances and changes. Specifically, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress either the change in 
cash from year t-1 to year t or the end of year cash balance scaled by beginning period total assets on cash 
tax savings (CTS). We include additional control variables based on Dhaliwal et al. (2011). We expect 
cash tax savings to be associated with more cash available to the firm and thus a positive coefficient on 
CTS. We perform this analysis for the current and subsequent two years to see how cash tax savings 
persists into future cash balances and changes. 
For this, and all subsequent OLS regressions, we cluster standard errors at the firm level to 
account for possible correlation in residuals, though our results remain qualitatively unchanged if, instead, 
we cluster by firm and year (see Gow et al. 2010) or use heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Where 
appropriate, we also include fixed effects at the country, industry, and year levels, where industry fixed 
effects are based at the two-digit Industry Classification Benchmark level. These fixed effects control for 
otherwise unobserved or difficult to measure factors that could potentially confound the regression 
results. 
                                                            
10 Dyreng et al. (2008) use a long-run CETR computed over a multi-year horizon.  Because of gaps in the data for 
our sample and the need for other controls which would drastically reduce our sample size, we are confined to using 
a yearly CETR measure and thus the yearly spread between the country-level statutory tax rate and the firm-level 
CETR. 
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Next, we examine how firms use their cash tax savings by testing the association between CTS 
and two potential uses: investment activities and dividend payouts to shareholders. For this analysis we 
separately estimate OLS regressions of the following form: 
Investi,t = β0 + β1CTSi,t-1  + β2CloseSharesi,t-1 + β3AQi,t-1  + β4 σCFO i,t-1  + 
 β5 σSALE i,t-1  + β6 σInvest i,t-1  + β7Sizei,t-1  + β8OverFirmi,t-1  + 
 β9OpCyclei,t-1  + β10Lossesi,t-1  + β11Foreigni,t-1  + β12PPEi,t-1 +                                
 β13BMi,t-1  + β14DivDummyi,t-1  + β15Agei,t-1  + β16Qi,t-1 +  εi,t                           (2a)   
  
DivPayi,t  = β0 + β1CTSi,t  +  β3CloseSharesi,t + β4AQi,t  + 
 β5 σCFO i,t  + β6 σSALE i,t + β7Sizei,t  + β8BMi,t  + β9CFConsti,t  + 
 β10Cashi,t  + β11Agei,t  + εi,t                                                                             (2b) 
 
In Equation (2a), we model both total investment and inefficient investment as a function of cash 
tax savings and other controls (see Biddle et al. 2009), testing each separately. In addition, we follow 
Cheng et al. (2013) and lag the right-hand side variables. We measure total investment, Invest, as the sum 
of research and development expenditures, capital expenditures, and acquisitions less dispositions of 
property, plant, and equipment, all deflated by lagged total assets. Invest is designed to capture both 
capital and non-capital investment. We also modify the Biddle et al. (2009) model by adding our measure 
of cash tax savings, CTS. When Invest is the dependent variable, a positive coefficient on CTS is 
consistent with firms using cash tax savings to fund investment.11  
Because prior literature suggests that firm-level corporate governance may affect investment 
(Biddle et al. 2009, Cheng et al. 2013), we include two variables to control for firm-level governance.12 
First, we use CloseShares, defined as the number of closely-held shares divided by total shares 
                                                            
11 One possible explanation for a negative coefficient on CTS would be that managers are extracting cash from the 
firm, and thus have less cash to invest (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
12 We are unable to use the G-Score (Gompers et al. 2003) and the E-Score (Bebchuk et al. 2009) governance 
measures because they are only available for US firms. 
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outstanding as a firm with a higher concentration of inside shareholders is more likely to suffer from 
governance issues. We also use a measure of financial reporting and accruals quality (AQ) based on 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Biddle et al. (2009). Biddle et al. (2009) find that financial reporting 
quality is positively related to overall investment, and negatively related to under- and overinvestment. 
As additional controls, we include variables likely to affect investment (see Biddle and Hilary 
2006, Liu and Wysocki 2007, Biddle et al. 2009), including: cash flow volatility (σCFO), sales volatility 
(σSALE), investment volatility (σINVEST), firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (BM), capital intensity 
(PPE), and dividend activity (DivDummy).  We include a control for the firm’s likelihood of 
overinvesting (OverFirm) based on overall cash and leverage. We also include controls for firm operating 
cycle (OpCycle), age (Age), and loss position (Losses) as firms may have different investment needs 
depending on their life cycle and business stage (Dechow 1994, Dechow et al. 1998, Dechow and Dichev 
2002). Finally, we include an indicator variable (FOREIGN), based on foreign sales, assets, or net 
income, and Tobin’s Q (Q) as a measure of foreign activity and growth opportunities, respectively, as 
firm with foreign operations and greater growth opportunities are more likely to invest. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
Equation (2b) tests whether firms distribute cash tax savings to shareholders in the form of a 
dividend. We adopt and modify the model used in DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Blaylock (2016). The 
dependent variable, DivPay, is replaced by one of two measures designed to capture the firm’s 
distributions to shareholders. The first is CashDiv and is computed as cash dividends paid scaled by total 
assets. The second is Payout, which is defined as dividends less the gain or loss on the sale of stock 
divided by lagged total assets.  Similar to Equations (2a) and (2b), the primary variable of interest is CTS. 
When CashDiv or Payout is the dependent variable, a positive coefficient on CTS is consistent with firms 
distributing cash tax savings to shareholders in the form of dividends. Alternatively, a negative coefficient 
is consistent with firms retaining cash savings in the firm rather than paying it out to shareholders. 
Consistent with the prior studies, all variables used in the payout regressions are measured 
contemporaneously. 
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We also control for other variables that are associated with a firm’s payout decision (see 
DeAngelo et al. 2006). Similar to the investment analysis, we control for insider ownership (CloseShares) 
and financial reporting quality (AQ). We also add controls for: cash flow volatility (σCFO) and sales 
(σSALES) volatility to control for the need to hold larger cash to reduce the costs of financial distress; 
book-to-market (BM) to control for investment opportunities; and size (Size) and cash (Cash) to control 
for the amount of cash available to be paid out at the beginning of the year. We also add an indicator 
variable, CFConst, to capture firms that are cash flow-constrained, and thus less able to pay dividends. 
Lastly, we control for firm age (Age), as dividend payouts are likely to vary based on firm life cycle.  
3.2.1. Investment Efficiency and Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings 
Next, we examine the efficiency of firms’ investment decisions. To test whether firms’ cash tax 
savings is associated with greater investment efficiency, we replace Invest in Equation (2a) with the 
absolute value of investment efficiency (absInvestEff). absInvestEff is calculated following Biddle et al. 
(2009) and Cheng et al. (2013) and is designed to capture deviations from expected investment (i.e., over- 
or underinvestment). We follow Biddle et al. (2009) and compute absInvestEff as the absolute value of the 
residuals obtained from the following model, estimated by country-industry-year: 
Investi,t+1 = β0 + β1 * SalesGrowthi,t + εi,t+1                                                                                                                            (3) 
where Invest is total investment, as previously defined, and SalesGrowth is the percentage change in sales 
from year t-1 to year t. When absInvestEff is used as the dependent variable in Equation (2a), a positive 
coefficient on CTS is consistent with less efficient investment because it signifies great over- or under 
investment, whereas a negative coefficient on CTS is consistent with more efficient investment. 
 
3.3. Country-Level Governance and Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings  
To examine the effect of country-level governance on investment and dividend payouts, we 
modify Equations (2a) and (2b) by adding a measure of country-level governance.  To proxy for country-
level governance we use LowGov, which is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is located in a 
country in the lowest tercile of the governance index as found in Bushman et al. (2004). The governance 
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index captures the quality of the corporate reporting environment in each respective country. Specifically, 
the index captures the comprehensiveness of firm disclosures related to the identity of managers, the 
identity of board members and their affiliations, compensation of officers and directors, share ownership 
by directors and employees, the identity of major shareholders, and the range of shareholding.13  
We interact the variable, LowGov with our tax savings variable, CTS. To test the effect of 
governance on investment efficiency, we use the modified Equation (2a). When absInvestEff is the 
dependent variable, a positive coefficient LowGov Interaction is consistent with firms in weak 
governance countries engaging in less efficient investment (e.g., either overinvesting or underinvesting).  
To test the effect of governance on dividend payouts, we modify Equation (2b) by including the 
interaction between LowGov and CTS. In the payout model, when CashDiv or Payout is the dependent 
variable, a positive coefficient on LowGov Interaction is consistent with firms in weak governance 
countries using cash tax savings to pay dividends and supports the reputation argument offered by La 
Porta et al. (2000). Alternatively, a negative coefficient on LowGov Interaction is consistent with firms in 
weak countries using cash tax savings for purposes other than paying dividends, and thus is consistent 
with the agency argument presented in La Porta et al. (2000). 
 
 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Sample Selection 
We obtain firm-level fundamental and financial variables from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Advanced Database, specifically Worldscope.  In addition, country-level data on statutory tax rates is 
obtained from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) website.  We start 
with all firm-year observations with available data between the years 1993 and 2011. Our analysis begins 
                                                            
13 We also use an alternative measure of country-level governance, the anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008). 
The measure captures the extent to which minority shareholders are protected from expropriation (or tunneling) 
from managers within each country. In general, we find consistent results.  
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in 1993 due to the general lack of tax-related data on Worldscope prior to that time. We manually collect 
data from Datastream, and thus our analysis is stopped at 2011 due to the amount of time necessary to 
manually collect the data, as well as the lag between year-end and when the data is available to collect.  
Because lagged variables, such as total assets, are used in the measurement of variables, the year 1993 is 
essentially eliminated from the analysis.  We include all observations available for each test, though 
sample sizes between tests may differ due to additional data restrictions.  
Along with this full sample, we also remove firms with foreign operations from the sample such 
that this reduced sample includes only domestic standalone entities (“domestic-only firms”). We do so for 
two reasons. First, the relation between cash tax savings and investment and payout policies is not 
confounded by multinational tax concerns for this subset of firms. Second, we are able to better measure 
cash tax savings for this subset of firms because these savings are unaffected by differences in 
characteristics and uses between domestic and foreign cash holdings (Hartford et al. 2017). 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 reports our sample composition by country for both multinational and domestic-only 
firms. Firms located in the United States and Japan comprise the largest portion of our sample.14 The US 
and Japan also have the highest average statutory tax rates during the sample period (39.3 percent and 
39.8 percent, respectively).15  
[Insert TABLE 1 here] 
 Table 2, Panels A and B report the firm-level descriptive statistics for our international sample of 
all firms (e.g., multinational and domestic) firms and domestic-only firms. We include the descriptive 
statistics for the full sample for completeness but focus on attention on the descriptive statistics reported 
in Panel B for the domestic-only sample. In Panel B, the mean and median of CTS is positive (0.015 and 
                                                            
14 We conduct our analyses excluding the United States and Japan and find consistent results. 
15 We make two notes here. First, the reported CSTRs reflect a blending of federal and local rates. This is consistent 
with other international tax studies (see Amiram et al. 2017 and Kerr 2018). Second, in 2012, Japan reduced its 
corporate statutory rate; however, because 2012 is not part of our sample period, our results are not affected by the 
rate change. In 2017, the US reduced its corporate statutory rate to 21 percent; the rate change will go into effect 
January 1, 2018. Again, this rate change does not affect our sample.   
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0.078, respectively) suggesting that firms report cash effective tax rates that are lower than their country’s 
statutory rate, which is consistent with Kerr (2018). The mean (median) value of Invest is 9.4 percent (5.8 
percent) of prior year’s assets. The mean and median values of absInvestEff are 0.063 and 0.040, 
respectively. Last, firms pay out a mean (median) cash dividend that is 1.6 percent (0.8 percent) of total 
assets. 
[Insert TABLE 2 here] 
 Table 3 reports the correlations between the variables with the correlations below the diagonal 
being for the full sample and those above the diagonal being for the domestic-only sample. As the 
domestic-only sample has no foreign operations, the foreign indicator variable here and in all future tables 
is omitted from the domestic-only regressions. For both samples, CTS is significantly and positively 
correlated with Invest, suggesting that cash tax savings is associated with greater investment. Moreover, 
CTS is significantly and positively correlated with absInvestEff, again for both samples, suggesting that 
greater cash tax savings is associated with less efficient investment. Taken together, the correlations 
suggest that firms use cash tax savings to fund investment, but their investment decision is not optimal. 
Last, for both samples CTS is significantly and negatively correlated with DivPay, suggesting that high 
tax savings firms pay fewer cash dividends. We next turn to multivariate tests.  
[Insert TABLE 3 here] 
 
 
5. Multivariate Results 
We conduct all our analyses using the full sample of international firms and our sample of 
domestic-only firms. We note that, in general, results are consistent across both samples.  
5.1. Cash Tax Savings and Cash Holdings 
 We begin by investigating a firm’s cash holdings and the relationship between cash and cash tax 
savings for our international sample of firms. Table 4 reports the results of this test. As seen in Columns 
(1) and (4), the coefficient on CTS is positive and significant, indicating that greater tax savings is 
18 
 
associated with larger cash holdings.  In terms of economic significance, we find that a one dollar 
increase in tax savings is associated with roughly a 16-cent increase in current cash holdings. We observe 
similar results in both the full and domestic-only samples. This suggests that tax savings increase the 
firm’s available cash and is consistent with the argument in Edwards et al. (2016b). 
Next, we test the relationship between current cash tax savings and future cash.  This is important 
because if current period tax savings is also positively associated with future cash then this implies that 
firms hold onto their cash tax savings rather than use them for other purposes.  As seen in Columns (5) 
and (6), we find that 1-year and 2-year forward cash holdings are not associated with current cash tax 
savings for the domestic-only sample. These results show that the association between cash tax savings 
and cash holdings is transitory, implying that firms make use of the cash from tax savings rather than 
holding it as observed in Hanlon et al. (2017).16 In particular, for the average firm, we find that a one 
dollar increase in cash tax savings is associated with a 16-cent increase in current year cash tax holdings, 
an 11-cent increase in the next year cash holdings, and no increase in the two-year ahead cash holdings.17 
 [Insert TABLE 4 here] 
 
 
5.2. Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings 
As the previous results show that cash from cash tax savings appears to be transitory, we next 
explore two potential uses: investment and payout. Table 5, Panel A reports results of the investment 
analysis. Again, we find consistent results in both samples, namely that firms with great cash tax savings 
have higher amounts of investment. Specifically, in Column (2), the coefficient on CTS is positive and 
significant (coefficient of  0.007), suggesting that the increase in investment observed is not being driven 
by distortions from cross-border tax considerations, implying that cash tax savings are driving the result. 
                                                            
16 We note that in untabulated analyses we use changes in cash instead of levels of cash. Our findings remain 
consistent regardless of measure. 
17 These calculations are performed by multiplying the coefficient on the variable of interest by the average ratio of 
the denominators for the dependent and independent variables of interest. 
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In addition, the effect is incremental to both other cash flow effects and the propensity of the firm to 
overinvest regardless of the level of cash tax savings (σCFO and OverFirm). This implies that cash tax 
savings exacerbates the overinvestment of cash documented in the prior literature (see Hubbard 1998 and 
Richardson 2006) and, therefore, provides support for our argument that cash generated through tax 
savings (and its accompanying effects) are distinct from other sources of cash (and their accompanying 
effects). In terms of economic significance, this implies that a one dollar increase in tax savings is 
associated with roughly a 15-cent increase in investment. 
Table 5, Panel B reports the results of our dividend payout analysis. Again, we find results 
consistent in both the full and domestic-only samples.  Specifically, in Column (5) the coefficient on CTS 
is negative and significant, suggesting that firms with greater cash tax savings pay less cash dividends. 
We find a similar result in Columns (6) through (8), when we use Payout or an indicator variable 
(DivDummy) as the dependent variable. These results suggest that, on average, firms with greater cash tax 
savings actually shift away from paying dividends. In terms of economic significance, these findings 
imply that a one dollar increase in tax savings is associated with roughly a six-cent decrease in dividends. 
We make an important note at this juncture. Specifically, our overall research question is to 
investigate how firms use cash tax savings. A simplistic view of this research question might be that more 
available cash means the potential for an increase in all cash-using activities. However, the negative 
coefficient here seems to suggest that firms with greater cash tax savings do not just merely increase cash-
using real activities, but rather have fundamental shifts in the real activities they engage in which 
transcends mere cash flow effects. This result further strengthens the argument that cash from tax savings 
are distinct from other sources of cash. The results above are also consistent with the findings in Blaylock 
(2016) and suggest that, on average, firms reinvest cash tax savings back into the firm rather than paying 
out to shareholders in the form of dividends. 
[Insert TABLE 5 here] 
 
5.2.1. Cash Tax Savings and Investment Efficiency 
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We next investigate the impact that cash tax savings has on firms’ investment efficiency. Table 6 
reports the results of our investment efficiency analysis. Using absInvestEff as the dependent variable, we 
find results consistent in both the full and domestic-only samples.  Specifically, Column (3) shows a 
statistically significant and positive coefficient (coefficient of 0.002) on CTS, suggesting that firms use of 
cash tax savings for investment purposes is associated with less efficient investment.  Again, we note that 
the effect of cash tax savings on investment efficiency is incremental to both other cash flow effects and 
the propensity of the firm to overinvest regardless of the level of cash tax savings (σCFO and OverFirm). 
We also note that while these results suggest that greater cash tax savings is associated with lower 
investment efficiency, it remains unclear whether this decrease in efficiency is due to over- or under-
investment. To address this ambiguity, we conduct an additional analysis. Specifically, we conduct an 
additional analysis using a multinomial logit model. To conduct this analysis, we rank the signed 
investment efficiency into quartiles – the top quartile captures over-investment, the bottom quartile 
captures under-investment, and the middle two quartiles capture “normal” investment (our baseline) and 
use these rankings as our dependent variable. The multinomial logit model then separately compares the 
over-investment and under-investment quartiles to the two baseline quartiles. Therefore, a positive 
coefficient on CTS for the over-(under-)investment versus normal is consistent with firms over-(under-) 
investing cash tax savings. 
We find that our results remain mostly unchanged across samples. Specifically, for the domestic-
only sample we find a positive and significant coefficient on CTS in the Over vs Normal model 
(coefficient of 0.114), and an insignificant coefficient on CTS in the Under vs Normal model and that 
these are similar to results for the full sample. This finding suggests that the association between cash tax 
savings and investment inefficiency is driven by over-investment. In addition, and as is the case in all 
previous analyses, results that are consistent in both samples imply that our results are not a subset of 
prior findings. 
In whole, the results of our analysis in Table 6 suggest that managers use additional cash tax 
savings to engage in empire building and that this association is not driven by distortions of multinational 
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corporations and/or the US’ worldwide tax system as shown by the prior literature. These findings are 
consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Desai et al. 2007), but 
inconsistent with tax avoidance being associated with relatively more optimal investment policies for US 
firms (Blaylock 2016). The discrepancy between the findings in Blaylock (2016) and Desai et al. (2007), 
combined with our results, demonstrates the importance of examining firms’ use of cash tax savings 
across countries, rather than within a single country.  
[Insert TABLE 6 here] 
5.3. Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings and Country-Level Governance 
 Under the agency view of tax avoidance, firms in areas of weaker corporate governance may be 
more likely to extract rents via tax avoidance.  Because both investment and payout can be used as a 
means of extracting rents—increased payout as a direct means of extracting rents and excess investment 
as a signal of empire building—we test whether the association between cash tax savings and investment 
and payout decisions is affected by country-level governance.  This analysis is motivated by the 
conflicting findings in Desai et al. (2007) and Blaylock (2016). Because our main regressions already 
control for firm-level governance, any effect found in these tests will be incremental to firm-level 
governance. 
Table 7, Panel A, reports the results of the analysis of the effect of country-level governance on 
investment efficiency. In this analysis, we include a dummy variable, LowGov, for country-level 
governance based upon the Governance index in Bushman et al. (2004). As country fixed effects would 
subsume the variable of interest, we exclude those effects from these regressions. The results in Table 7, 
Column (3) show the coefficient on the interaction term (LowGov Interaction) between tax savings and 
country-level governance is positive and significant. The sum of this coefficient with the coefficient on 
CTS alone suggests that firms in countries with weaker governance and regulatory environments use cash 
tax savings less efficiently for investment purposes when compared with firms that operate in countries 
with stronger governance.  
22 
 
To distinguish whether this association is driven by the firm over- or under-investing, we modify 
our original multinomial logit model to include the interaction term LowGov Interaction. The results of 
this analysis are reported in Column (4) of Table 7, Panel A. We find a positive and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term in the Under vs Normal model and an insignificant coefficient on the interaction 
term in the Over vs Normal model. This finding suggests that the association between cash tax savings 
and investment efficiency in low governance countries is driven by under-investment, rather than over-
investment. 
Table 7, Panel B, reports the results of our payout analysis. In Columns (3) and (4) the interaction 
is consistently positive and significant, suggesting that firms domiciled in countries with weaker 
governance have higher levels of both cash dividend and overall payout.  
Taken together, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that firms in weak governance countries 
tend to underinvest and distribute cash tax savings to shareholders in the form of dividends. Although 
consistent with rent extraction, the findings are also consistent with the reputation building argument 
presented in La Porta et al. (2000). Specifically, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that managers of firms in 
weak governance countries may pay dividends in order to build a reputation for the fair treatment of 
shareholders.  This serves as a signal to investors and the market that management is not using tax 
avoidance strategies to extract rents from the firm and thus these firms are potentially able to raise 
external capital at more favorable terms. 
[Insert TABLE 7 here] 
 
6. Additional Analysis 
6.1. Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings and Investment Subtypes 
 In this analysis, we examine another investment characteristic: firms’ subtypes of investment.  
When investing, firms often have a portfolio of choices in which to invest, such as intangible or physical 
assets. In addition, prior literature suggests that intangible assets may present greater opportunities for 
future tax avoidance because intangible assets can be easily transferred between operating units and thus 
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may also be used to shift income from high tax to low tax jurisdictions to generate future tax savings 
(Grubert and Slemrod 1998, Grubert 2003,  Dyreng et al. 2008). Therefore, to the extent that firm 
investment is associated with cash tax savings, firms may prefer to invest in one type of asset over 
another. 
To test a firm’s investment preferences, we break Invest into three different components, each 
deflated by beginning of period total assets – capital expenditures (CapEx), measured as the capital 
expenditures less dispositions of property plant and equipment, non-capital expenditures (Non-CapEx), 
measured as the sum of research and development and acquisitions; and intangibles (Intangibles), 
measured as intangibles. We re-estimate Equation (2a) separately using each of the three measures as the 
dependent variable.  
Table 8 reports the results of our analysis for the domestic-only sample using the three 
components of investment. Specifically, we test whether the increased level of investment is being driven 
by CapEx, Non-CapEx and/or Intangibles.  The results of this test are shown in Table 8, Columns (1) 
through (3).  As seen there, we find that cash tax savings is associated with increased CapEx, Non-CapEx 
and Intangibles. This implies that cash tax savings are used for both capital and non-capital purposes, and 
that firms are not investing primarily in intangible assets to facilitate future tax avoidance.18 
[Insert TABLE 8 here] 
 
6.2. Cash Tax Savings and Share Repurchases 
 Although our primary analysis focuses on dividend payouts because we rely on prior literature 
(i.e., Blaylock 2016), for completeness we also examine another form of distributions to shareholders: 
share repurchases. To estimate the effect of cash tax savings on share repurchases, we rely on Nessa 
(2017) to estimate the following model: 
ChTreasStocki,t  = β0 + β1CTSi,t  +  β3Levi,t + β4CapExi,t  + 
                                                            
18 In untabulated analyses we find generally consistent results using the full sample: that increased investment is 
found in all three subtypes. 
24 
 
 β5 σCFO i,t  + β6 σSALE i,t + β7Sizei,t  + β8PPEi,t  + β9BMi,t  + 
 β10DivDummyi,t  + β11Agei,t  + εi,t                                                                            (4) 
 
Due to data limitations in Worldscope, we use the change in treasury stock to proxy for share 
repurchases. The primary variable of interest in Equation (4) is CTS. A positive coefficient on CTS is 
consistent with firms distributing cash tax savings to shareholders via share repurchases. Alternatively, a 
negative coefficient is consistent with firms retaining cash savings in the firm rather than repurchasing 
shares. Consistent with the prior studies, all variables used in the payout regressions are measured 
contemporaneously.  
Table 9, Columns (1) and (2) report the results of our analysis of stock repurchase activity for the 
full international and domestic-only samples. In both samples, we observe a positive and significant 
association between CTS and changes in treasury stock, which is consistent with firms using cash tax 
savings to repurchase shares. While the results of our primary analysis suggest that firms, on average, 
prefer to reinvest tax savings rather than distribute them to shareholders, our share repurchase analysis 
suggests that firms may distribute cash tax savings. This result may be explained by the differences 
between to the two payout vehicles (Guay and Hartford 2000, Jagannathan et al. 2000, Nessa 2017). 
Specifically, because dividends implicitly commit firms to future payout, and cash flows from tax 
planning may be uncertain, firms may prefer to use repurchases and therefore retain flexibility on when 
they choose to distribute these savings. 
[Insert TABLE 9 here] 
6.3. Firms’ Use of Cash Tax Savings and Corporate Statutory Tax Rates Changes 
To better identify the effect of cash tax savings on firms’ investment and payout decisions, we 
examine the effects of corporate statutory tax rates changes at the country level. This analysis is important 
as it moves the tests away from association-only tests, which can be potentially confounded by firm 
choice and uses, and instead uses firm-exogenous changes in statutory tax rates. 
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To conduct this analysis, we re-estimate Equations (2a) and (2b) where the dependent variable of 
interest is the change in the corporate statutory tax rate (CSTRChg) from year t-1 to year 1. For the 
interpretation of the coefficients here to be consistent with our prior analyses, we then multiply CSTRChg 
by -1 so that it is increasing in greater savings. In addition, as the change in the corporate statutory tax 
rate is a country-level variable, we perform the regressions at the country-industry- level, as this reflects 
the change in focus of measuring tax savings at the country level while also allowing for a sample size 
with reasonable power. Accordingly, we measure all control variables in these regressions as country-
industry-year medians of firm-level observations.  
Table 10 reports the results of this analysis. We find that decreases in statutory tax rates are 
associated with more investment and greater repurchases, which is consistent with firms using additional 
cash tax savings to fund these activities. This result is consistent with our primary, firm-level findings. In 
addition, while we find that the sign on the dividend-related coefficients are consistent with our prior 
results, we note that they no longer have statistical significance. 
[Insert TABLE 10 here] 
6.4. Untabulated Robustness Tests 
6.4.1. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Although prior literature often treats the choice of investment and payout as independent, the 
choices likely relate to and affect one another. For example, because funding investments with external 
funds is costly (Myers 1984, Fama and French 2002), firms may forego paying dividends if they have 
investment opportunities.19  Alternatively, because of the agency costs associated with free cash flows 
(Jensen 1986), firms may forego investment for a higher payout to help alleviate these concerns. 
Although the previous literature on investment and dividend payout predominantly use OLS regressions, 
the reasoning above implies that investment and payout decisions may not be made in isolation from each 
other.  Therefore, in untabulated robustness we use a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression approach 
                                                            
19 Our goal is not to test the distortions of tax policy on investment or payout (see Hanlon and Heitzman 2010 for a 
review of this literature), but rather to test how the availability of additional cash generated via tax savings affects 
firms’ real activities. 
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that jointly estimates the investment and payout decisions.  We find that our results, and thus our 
conclusions, remain unchanged using this approach.  
6.4.2. Excluding the United States and Japan 
To provide robustness to our main results, we exclude either or both the United States and Japan 
from the regressions using cash, dividends, investment, and investment efficiency.  We do so because, as 
the United States and Japan contain the greatest number of firms, their presence in the sample may be 
unduly influencing our results.  By excluding these countries, we ensure that our results are not being 
biased by their inclusion.  Untabulated results of tests excluding these countries, either separately or 
together, remain qualitatively unchanged.  
6.4.3. Measuring Savings using Book Effective Tax Rates 
Although our tests have focused on the amount of cash tax savings (i.e., CTS), we also perform 
untabulated tests using the spread between a country’s statutory tax rate and the book effective tax rate 
(ETR), computed as total tax expense divided by pretax income, as the variable of interest. Because we 
are interested specifically in cash savings through tax avoidance, we do not use this measure in our main 
analyses. However, because the ETR has greater data availability, it can be useful to check the veracity of 
our results. In general, our results are consistent using either measure, though are, at times, attenuated 
when using the ETR spread. 
 
6.4.4. Alternative benchmarks for Cash Tax Savings 
In our main analyses we use the corporate statutory rate as the benchmark against which to set the 
expectation on the amount of cash taxes to be paid and thus the amount of cash tax savings.  However, to 
the extent that firms are able to routinely engage in tax savings unique to or related to the country in 
which they are domiciled (and to the extent that this relation is not captured by the use of either country or 
year fixed effects) the use of the CSTR as a benchmark may distort the amount of cash tax savings.  
Although we report some evidence against this in our analysis using the change in the corporate statutory 
tax rate, we also perform a host of untabulated analyses. Specifically, we use ten different alternative 
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benchmarks  against which to measure the amount of cash tax savings: 1) the country-level mean 
corporate statutory tax rate, 2) the country-level median corporate statutory tax rate, 3) the country-level 
mean cash effective tax rate, 4) the country-year-level mean cash effective tax rate, 5) the country-level 
median cash effective tax rate, 6) the country-year-level median cash effective tax rate, 7) the country-
level mean effective tax rate, 8) the country-year-level mean effective tax rate, 9) the country-level 
median effective tax rate, and 10) the country-year-level median effective tax rate.  In all cases our results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
6.4.5. Controls for Cash 
In our main analyses we follow models from the prior literature to estimate our results.  While 
each model controls for possible cash effects (σCFO, OverFirm, and CFConst), an explicit control for the 
level or change in cash is not present.  To provide additional robustness to our interpretation that cash tax 
savings are distinct and incremental to other cash effects, we perform untabulated analyses that also 
explicitly control for either the level or change in cash.20  Our results and the interpretation of them 
remain qualitatively unchanged, providing additional support for our ex ante argument and ex post 
interpretation that cash generated via cash tax savings is different from, with the effect being incremental 
to, cash generated via other means. 
7. Conclusion 
We examine firms’ cash tax savings and how those savings affect firm-level cash holdings, 
investment, and shareholder payout for an international sample of firms. We distinguish our study from 
US-only studies, which focus on constraints and distortions of multinational corporations in a worldwide 
tax system, by conducting our analyses on a sample of domestic-only firms. We find, on average, that 
firms with greater cash tax savings have larger, transitory cash balances, and that firms use the cash tax 
savings to fund investment, as opposed to paying cash dividends.  This suggests that firms prefer to 
reinvest tax savings in the firms rather the distributing it to shareholders; this finding is consistent with 
                                                            
20 We also perform analyses using regression models that control for CFConst when investment is the dependent 
variable, both with and without controls for cash levels and changes.  Our results remain unchanged. 
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pecking order theory. Tests of firms’ investment practices show that firms choose to invest cash tax 
savings in both capital and non-capital investments and that these firms generally tend to overinvest. 
When we examine the effect of country-level governance, we find that firms located in weak-governance 
countries pay out larger amounts of cash dividends while also underinvesting. This finding is consistent 
with firms located in weak governance countries removing the cash savings from the firm instead of 
keeping the cash savings within the firm. Moreover, our finding that firms in weak governance countries 
pay more in cash dividends is consistent with the reputation argument presented in La Porta et al. (2000).  
The results of our study offer several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
stream of literature that examines the consequences of tax avoidance (e.g., Rego and Hutchens 2015, 
Hanlon et al. 2017) by providing evidence that firms’ tax avoidance activities affect other corporate 
decisions, specifically investment and payout policies, and that this effect varies across countries with 
different regulatory and governance environments.  In addition, we do so using a broad, large-sample 
international setting, one of which is under-investigated in the current literature as the majority of studies 
focus on US-only samples. We also contribute to literature on the governance view of tax avoidance (i.e., 
Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Desai et al. 2007, Blaylock 2016) by providing evidence that the effect of 
governance on the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial opportunism is a country-level 
phenomenon.  In doing so, we help to reconcile the seemingly conflicting results between Desai et al. 
(2007) and Blaylock (2016).  
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Appendix  
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Variable Definition  
Investment:  
  Invest The sum of research and development expenditures, capital expenditures and 
acquisitions less dispositions of property plant and equipment, deflated by total 
assets in t-1 (Biddle et al. 2009). 
 
  absInvestEff The absolute value of the error term from a regression of Invest on the 
percentage change in sales (Biddle et al. 2009). 
 
 CapEx Capital expenditures less dispositions of property plant and equipment, 
deflated by total assets in t-1. 
  
Non-CapEx 
 
The sum of research and development expenditures and acquisitions, deflated 
by total assets in t-1. 
 
 Intangibles Intangibles deflated by total assets in t-1. 
DivPay:  
 CashDiv Cash dividends paid scaled by total assets in year t.  
 
 Payout Dividends less gain/loss on the sale of stock scaled by lagged total assets. 
Cash Tax Savings:  
 CTS The country’s statutory tax rate less the cash effective tax rate (computed as 
cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax income). CTS is set to missing if pretax 
income is negative. 
 
Governance:  
 LowGov Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is located in a country in the 
lowest tercile of Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) governance index.  
 
Control Variables: 
 
 CloseShares Closely-held shares at t divided by total shares outstanding at t. 
 
 AQ Accrual quality, based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Biddle et al. (2009), 
computed as -1 times the standard deviation of the residual (from t-5 to t-1) 
obtained from regressing a change in working capital on cash from operations 
in t+1, cash from operations in t, cash from operations in t-1, change in 
revenue, and property plant and equipment, with all variables scaled by total 
assets in t-1. The model is estimated by country, industry and year, provided 
the country-industry-year has 10 or more observations. 
 
 σCFO Standard deviation, computed from year t-5 to year t-1, of cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets in t-1. 
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Appendix (continued) 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Control Variables:  
  
σSale 
Standard deviation, computed from year t-5 to year t-1, of sales scaled by total 
assets in t-1. 
 
 σInvest Standard deviation, computed from year t-5 to year t-1, of Invest.  
 
 Size Natural log of total assets in year t. 
 
 OverFirm A ranked variable based on the average of a ranked deciles measure of cash 
and leverage. Leverage is multiplied by minus one before ranking so that both 
variables are increasing in the likelihood of over-investment.  
 OpCycle Log of net receivables divided by sales, plus inventory divided by cost of 
goods sold, all multiplied by 360. 
 
 Losses Binary variable set equal to 1 if the net income in year t and year t-1 is less 
than 0, and zero otherwise. 
 
 Foreign Binary variable set equal to 1 if the firm reports foreign sales, foreign assets, or 
foreign net income in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
 PPE Property, plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets in t-1. 
 
 BM Book value of equity deflated by the market value of equity. The market value 
of equity is computed as the closing stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding. 
 
 DivDummy Binary variable, set equal to 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t. 
 
 Age Natural log of current year less the base year (per Datastream/Worldscope). 
 
 Q Tobin’s q, computed as the market value of equity plus liabilities, all divided 
by total assets. 
 
 CFConst Cash flow constraints, computed as negative 1 multiplied by net cash from 
operations scaled by total assets in t-1. 
 
 Cash Cash at t deflated by total assets in t-1. 
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N %
Mean 
CTS
Mean Country 
Statutory Tax 
Rate Governance
AUSTRALIA 1,558     3.38% -0.044 30.3% 94
AUSTRIA 64          0.14% 0.032 29.0% 79
BELGIUM 79          0.17% 0.018 36.1% 76
CANADA 1,360     2.95% 0.072 33.6% 66
CHILE 306        0.66% -0.027 16.6% 76
CZECH REPUBLIC 15          0.03% 0.039 30.3% -
DENMARK 290        0.63% -0.031 28.5% 77
FINLAND 268        0.58% -0.088 27.1% 89
FRANCE 1,149     2.49% 0.058 35.4% 66
GERMANY 1,198     2.60% 0.020 37.1% 73
GREECE 95          0.21% -0.319 26.0% 66
IRELAND 100        0.22% -0.173 15.2% 92
ISRAEL 99          0.21% 0.001 29.5% 66
ITALY 302        0.65% -0.182 32.1% 66
JAPAN 10,837   23.50% -0.095 39.8% 83
MEXICO 13          0.03% 0.043 30.0% 66
NETHERLANDS 8            0.02% -0.005 31.3% 86
NEW ZEALAND 286        0.62% 0.005 31.6% 95
NORWAY 66          0.14% 0.012 28.0% 90
POLAND 299        0.65% -0.087 19.1% -
PORTUGAL 152        0.33% 0.014 29.8% 70
SOUTH KOREA 62          0.13% 0.065 27.0% 78
SPAIN 153        0.33% 0.046 33.4% 80
SWEDEN 720        1.56% -0.034 27.6% 97
SWITZERLAND 697        1.51% -0.070 22.9% 87
TURKEY 266        0.58% -0.037 22.6% 67
UNITED KINGDOM 6,064     13.15% -0.015 29.5% 95
UNITED STATES 19,615   42.53% 0.089 39.3% 76
46,121   100%
Table 1. Sample Composition by Country with Descriptive Statistics
Notes.  This table presents sample composition by country along with a summary of the means of 
pertinent descriptive statistics. Variable definitions are available in the Appendix.  The descriptive 
statistics are based upon data for the years 1993 through 2011 and with data sufficient to estimate the 
empirical model for investment.  CSTR  is the average enacted corporate statutory rate over the 
sample period, and reflects a blending of federal and local rates. This table includes firms with both 
multinational and domestic operations ("full sample").
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ChgCash 55,092 0.028 0.150 -0.212 0.006 0.486
Cash 55,093 0.172 0.237 0.000 0.103 0.919
Invest 55,373 0.098 0.139 -0.103 0.064 0.671
absInvestEff 43,216 0.064 0.752 0.001 0.041 0.473
CashDiv 55,221 0.016 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.150
CTS 46,121 0.012 0.463 -3.013 0.081 0.656
CloseShares 55,373 0.383 0.351 0.001 0.323 2.047
AQ 55,373 -0.400 0.985 -6.537 -0.097 -0.010
σCFO 55,373 0.058 0.148 0.005 0.032 0.391
σSale 55,373 0.268 0.339 0.021 0.174 1.715
σInvest 55,373 0.083 0.149 0.003 0.040 0.673
Size 55,373 20.28 1.988 15.71 20.22 25.07
OpCycle 55,373 -414.4 253.8 -1214 -388.3 167.3
Losses 55,373 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 1.000
Foreign 55,373 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000
PPE/TA 55,373 0.663 0.470 0.028 0.579 2.152
DivDummy 55,373 0.708 0.455 0.000 1.000 1.000
BM 55,373 0.891 1.224 -0.060 0.612 6.300
Age 55,373 2.724 0.662 1.099 2.773 3.689
Q 55,373 1.618 1.499 0.517 1.253 6.638
CFConst 54,964 -0.109 0.112 -0.459 -0.097 0.125
NWC 55,373 0.226 0.297 -0.298 0.192 0.988
Lev 55,373 0.578 0.405 0.065 0.551 1.679
CapEx 55,373 0.059 0.070 0.001 0.040 0.342
Table 2. Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in regression analyses. Variable definitions follow 
those as detailed in the Appendix. The descriptive statistics are based upon data for the years 1993 through 2011. The 
"full-sample" is comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic operations.
Panel A: Full sample
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ChgCash 37,726 0.028 0.155 -0.213 0.005 0.524
Cash 37,726 0.168 0.237 0.000 0.096 0.942
Invest 37,908 0.094 0.142 -0.108 0.058 0.685
absInvestEff 33,043 0.063 0.075 0.001 0.040 0.473
CashDiv 37,789 0.016 0.026 0.000 0.008 0.158
CTS 30,190 0.015 0.459 -2.866 0.078 0.656
CloseShares 37,908 0.416 0.362 0.001 0.363 2.406
AQ 37,908 -0.395 0.996 -6.537 -0.095 -0.009
σCFO 37,908 0.062 0.161 0.005 0.033 0.444
σSale 37,908 0.286 0.366 0.020 0.183 1.921
σInvest 37,908 0.084 0.155 0.002 0.040 0.704
Size 37,908 19.991 1.966 15.515 19.929 24.914
OpCycle 37,908 -432.6 271.4 -1276.5 -405.2 199.8
Losses 37,908 0.090 0.286 0.000 0.000 1.000
Foreign 37,908 0.377 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
PPE/TA 37,908 0.682 0.493 0.024 0.596 2.291
DivDummy 37,908 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000 1.000
BM 37,908 0.967 1.329 -0.049 0.658 7.613
Age 37,908 2.673 0.653 1.099 2.708 3.689
Q 37,908 1.564 1.536 0.503 1.204 6.530
CFConst 37,505 -0.106 0.120 -0.478 -0.094 0.142
NWC 37,908 0.220 0.310 -0.314 0.181 1.016
Lev 37,908 0.582 0.427 0.059 0.552 1.726
CapEx 37,908 0.061 0.075 0.001 0.040 0.372
Table 2. Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in regression analyses. Variable definitions follow 
those as detailed in the Appendix. The descriptive statistics are based upon data for the years 1993 through 2011. The 
"domestic-only sample" is comprised of firms with only domestic operations. 
Panel B: Domestic-only Sample
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
ChgCash (1) 1 0.641* 0.0137* 0.0376* -0.0728* 0.0787* -0.0200* -0.0449* 0.156* 0.106* 0.0582* -0.0596* -0.000820 -0.0172* -0.0367* -0.0434* -0.0760* 0.159* -0.291* 0.382* 0.0659* 0.0124
Cash/TA (2) 0.681* 1 0.0605* 0.0825* 0.0443* 0.0393* 0.0127 -0.0586* 0.233* 0.133* 0.00146 -0.211* 0.000877 -0.0181* -0.255* -0.0844* -0.170* 0.286* -0.277* 0.592* -0.151* -0.0691*
Invest (3) 0.0474* 0.0938* 1 0.658* -0.0414* 0.0564* -0.101* -0.140* 0.110* 0.0587* 0.352* -0.0104 -0.0187* -0.0164* 0.188* -0.117* -0.113* 0.171* -0.299* 0.00693 0.318* 0.450*
absInvestEff (4) 0.0311* 0.0829* 0.652* 1 -0.00128 0.0405* -0.0645* -0.142* 0.112* 0.127* 0.327* -0.118* -0.0233* 0.00193 0.0110 -0.0833* -0.113* 0.124* -0.179* 0.0512* 0.236* 0.256*
DivPay (5) -0.0767* -0.00602 -0.0401* -0.00235 1 -0.0212* 0.0522* 0.0395* 0.0180* -0.00637 -0.0309* -0.0679* -0.0335* -0.0351* 0.00754 -0.121* -0.00642 0.208* -0.224* 0.00753 -0.0897* -0.00231
CTS (6) 0.0745* 0.0516* 0.0448* 0.0368* -0.0262* 1 -0.0506* -0.0684* 0.0294* 0.00732 0.0124 -0.0107 -0.0218* -0.141* 0.0307* -0.0777* -0.00720 0.0964* -0.167* 0.0515* 0.0224* 0.0592*
CloseShares (7) -0.0249* -0.0178* -0.0972* -0.0596* 0.0358* -0.0413* 1 0.0820* -0.0128 0.00465 -0.0639* -0.165* 0.0199* 0.0111 0.00462 0.466* -0.111* -0.154* 0.0556* 0.0149* -0.0436* -0.0417*
AQ (8) -0.0639* -0.0760* -0.116* -0.117* 0.0438* -0.0573* 0.0700* 1 -0.135* -0.105* -0.128* 0.117* 0.127* 0.000736 -0.000639 0.0828* 0.0926* -0.156* 0.174* -0.0660* -0.00370 -0.118*
σCFO (9) 0.183* 0.218* 0.123* 0.102* -0.00942* 0.0414* -0.00800 -0.126* 1 0.481* 0.313* -0.188* 0.0190* 0.00461 -0.0814* -0.0611* -0.151* 0.166* -0.180* 0.201* -0.00932 0.0531*
σSale (10) 0.128* 0.132* 0.0669* 0.120* -0.0269* 0.0180* 0.0184* -0.108* 0.444* 1 0.302* -0.212* -0.121* 0.0132 -0.196* -0.0499* -0.163* 0.121* -0.106* 0.128* 0.124* -0.0203*
σInvest (11) 0.0854* 0.0460* 0.320* 0.322* -0.0325* 0.0107* -0.0522* -0.115* 0.361* 0.341* 1 -0.0397* -0.0451* 0.0271* -0.0490* -0.0392* -0.121* 0.0415* -0.0958* -0.0450* 0.176* 0.116*
Size (12) -0.0520* -0.151* -0.0220* -0.0951* -0.0244* -0.0226* -0.187* 0.100* -0.195* -0.238* -0.0696* 1 -0.0462* 0.00113 0.197* 0.000714 0.193* -0.0960* 0.0761* -0.372* 0.279* 0.0630*
OpCycle (13) -0.0119* -0.00880 0.00446 -0.0244* -0.0451* -0.0228* 0.00776 0.131* -0.0104* -0.152* -0.0482* -0.0128* 1 0.00142 -0.235* 0.0729* 0.111* -0.0568* 0.228* 0.378* -0.0545* -0.191*
Losses (14) 0.0113* 0.00493 -0.0542* 0.00781 -0.133* -0.0426* 0.0198* -0.00663 0.0594* 0.0550* 0.0394* -0.0914* 0.0153* 1 -0.0189* 0.0140* -0.00688 -0.0243* 0.0561* -0.0318* 0.0342* -0.0281*
Foreign (15) 0.0124* 0.0422* 0.0732* 0.0412* 0.0329* -0.0164* -0.0925* 0.0496* -0.0149* -0.0590* 0.0163* 0.207* 0.229* 0.0145* 1
PPE/TA (16) -0.0295* -0.221* 0.178* 0.00685 0.0154* 0.0151* 0.0251* 0.00837 -0.0634* -0.184* -0.0440* 0.162* -0.186* -0.0130* -0.110* 1 0.0155* 0.174* -0.102* -0.156* -0.393* 0.207* 0.504*
BM (17) -0.0503* -0.0936* -0.122* -0.0811* -0.107* -0.0737* 0.455* 0.0777* -0.0530* -0.0363* -0.0283* -0.0283* 0.0533* 0.0546* -0.0678* 0.0293* 1 0.0471* -0.355* 0.200* -0.0275* -0.0577* -0.0840*
Age (18) -0.0789* -0.156* -0.105* -0.111* 0.0147* -0.0270* -0.128* 0.0837* -0.146* -0.199* -0.141* 0.244* 0.117* -0.0261* 0.0626* 0.169* 0.0386* 1 -0.161* 0.160* -0.114* 0.0351* -0.0529*
Q (19) 0.155* 0.264* 0.185* 0.113* 0.172* 0.0936* -0.150* -0.136* 0.150* 0.119* 0.0475* -0.0668* -0.0378* -0.0469* 0.0695* -0.109* -0.324* -0.143* 1 -0.436* 0.187* -0.0297* 0.103*
CFConst (20) -0.232* -0.223* -0.273* -0.173* -0.213* -0.140* 0.0673* 0.140* -0.0884* -0.0546* -0.0683* 0.0301* 0.205* 0.123* -0.0396* -0.134* 0.174* 0.122* -0.365* 1 -0.0866* 0.0110 -0.327*
NWC (21) 0.395* 0.560* 0.0365* 0.0300* -0.0252* 0.0564* -0.00609 -0.0734* 0.164* 0.113* -0.0426* -0.318* 0.329* -0.0412* 0.0491* -0.332* -0.0279* -0.113* 0.169* -0.0951* 1 -0.371* -0.170*
Lev (22) 0.174* -0.0407* 0.319* 0.240* -0.0709* 0.0223* -0.0262* -0.00552 0.0629* 0.152* 0.177* 0.200* -0.0515* 0.0430* 0.0180* 0.173* -0.0871* 0.0129* 0.0102* 0.0590* -0.326* 1 0.173*
CapEx (23) 0.0295* -0.0454* 0.441* 0.234* 0.0110* 0.0406* -0.0291* -0.104* 0.0640* -0.0164* 0.124* 0.0493* -0.166* -0.0792* -0.0505* 0.510* -0.0712* -0.0502* 0.0891* -0.275* -0.143* 0.149* 1
Table 3. Correlation Matrix
Notes. This table presents pairwise correlations of variables used in primary analyses where the correlations below the diagonal are for the full sample and those above the diagonal are for the domestic-only sample. Correlations that are significant at the 5 percent level are asterisked.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash t Cash t+1 Cash t+2 Cash t Cash t+1 Cash t+2
CTS 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.000 0.007*** 0.004* -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
CloseShares 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.009** 0.019*** 0.023***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
NWC 0.565*** 0.235*** 0.197*** 0.564*** 0.232*** 0.196***
[0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.012] [0.011]
Lev 0.112*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.109*** -0.038*** -0.039***
[0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006]
CapEx 0.155*** 0.018 0.009 0.155*** 0.021 0.012
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.017] [0.015]
RD 0.709*** 0.662*** 0.667*** 0.747*** 0.677*** 0.683***
[0.044] [0.048] [0.054] [0.050] [0.054] [0.059]
Size 0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.002 -0.007*** -0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
OpCycle -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Losses 0.020*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.006 0.014***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Foreign 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.012***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
PPE -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.048***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]
BM -0.002 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
DivDummy -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Age -0.003 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.004** -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Q 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.010***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 91187 81833 67505 62867 55724 45648
Adjusted R-squared 0.543 0.383 0.355 0.551 0.368 0.340
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Notes. This table presents OLS regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels 
are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though the 
coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-
sample" is comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic operations.
Full sample Domestic-only Sample
Table 4. Cash Tax Savings and Level of Cash Holdings
40
Full sample Domestic-only Sample
(1) (2)
Invest Invest
CTS 0.006*** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.001]
CloseShares -0.008** -0.008**
[0.003] [0.003]
AQ -0.004*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.002]
σCFO 0.030** 0.035**
[0.013] [0.017]
σSale -0.011*** -0.013***
[0.003] [0.004]
σInvest 0.057*** 0.061***
[0.014] [0.015]
Size 0.001* 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001]
Overfirm 0.006*** 0.005***
[0.000] [0.001]
OpCycle 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]
Losses -0.009** -0.010**
[0.004] [0.004]
PPE 0.005*** 0.050***
[0.002] [0.003]
BM 0.055*** -0.003***
[0.003] [0.001]
DivDummy -0.003*** -0.016***
[0.001] [0.003]
Age -0.019*** -0.015***
[0.003] [0.002]
Q 0.013*** 0.012***
[0.002] [0.002]
Observations 45227 29510
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.153
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y
Table 5. Uses of Cash Tax Savings
Panel A: Investment
Notes: This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimations.  All variables are as defined 
in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are 
included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance 
levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** 
p<0.01. The "full-sample" is comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic 
operations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS Logit Probit OLS OLS Logit Probit
CashDiv Payout DivDummy DivDummy CashDiv Payout DivDummy DivDummy
CTS -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.463*** -0.236*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.467*** -0.238***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.047] [0.022] [0.000] [0.001] [0.059] [0.027]
CloseShares 0.005*** 0.010*** 1.343*** 0.711*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 1.154*** 0.627***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.111] [0.059] [0.001] [0.001] [0.116] [0.062]
AQ 0.000 0.001** 0.377*** 0.224*** 0.000 0.001** 0.388*** 0.228***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.028] [0.015] [0.000] [0.001] [0.033] [0.018]
σCFO -0.001 -0.003 -1.747 -0.427* -0.000 -0.000 -2.276** -0.740***
[0.001] [0.002] [1.485] [0.257] [0.002] [0.001] [0.937] [0.249]
σSale -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.203 -0.168*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.107 -0.095**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.132] [0.048] [0.002] [0.001] [0.090] [0.045]
Size -0.000* 0.000 0.330*** 0.193*** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.349*** 0.206***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.018] [0.010]
BM -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.025 -0.025* -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.019 -0.017
[0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.015] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.016]
CFConst -0.050*** -0.075*** -1.035*** -0.510*** -0.048*** -0.077*** -0.928*** -0.475***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.238] [0.121] [0.005] [0.008] [0.238] [0.134]
Cash 0.000 -0.032*** -0.783*** -0.490*** 0.002 -0.033*** -0.413*** -0.277***
[0.001] [0.007] [0.140] [0.074] [0.001] [0.007] [0.119] [0.069]
Age 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.672*** 0.402*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.622*** 0.374***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.041] [0.022] [0.000] [0.001] [0.044] [0.025]
Observations 48892 48088 49011 49011 32299 31688 32376 32376
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.198 0.090 0.165 0.163 0.199 0.091 0.167 0.164
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Notes. This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are reported 
in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance 
levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-sample" is comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic 
operations.
Full sample Domestic-only Sample
Table 5. Use of Cash Tax Savings
Panel B: Dividends
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(1) (3)
OLS OLS
absInvestEff Under vs Normal Over vs Normal absInvestEff Under vs Normal Over vs Normal
CTS 0.002*** 0.026 0.058** 0.002*** -0.008 0.114***
[0.001] [0.026] [0.028] [0.001] [0.031] [0.037]
CloseShares -0.001 0.095** -0.100** -0.001 0.201*** -0.135**
[0.002] [0.041] [0.046] [0.002] [0.049] [0.057]
AQ -0.001 -0.009 0.036*** -0.002** -0.025 0.022
[0.001] [0.012] [0.012] [0.001] [0.015] [0.015]
σCFO -0.003 -0.131 0.009 -0.001 -0.026 0.174
[0.005] [0.133] [0.132] [0.007] [0.160] [0.161]
σSale 0.004** 0.153*** -0.141*** 0.003 0.114** -0.206***
[0.002] [0.044] [0.051] [0.002] [0.051] [0.061]
σInvest 0.026*** 0.198** 0.791*** 0.026*** 0.188* 0.914***
[0.004] [0.094] [0.095] [0.005] [0.114] [0.114]
Size -0.001*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.001*** -0.118*** -0.081***
[0.000] [0.007] [0.007] [0.000] [0.009] [0.009]
Overfirm -0.000 -0.038*** 0.141*** -0.000 -0.029*** 0.128***
[0.000] [0.008] [0.008] [0.000] [0.010] [0.010]
OpCycle 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Losses 0.005** 0.116*** -0.210*** 0.005** 0.143*** -0.247***
[0.002] [0.042] [0.050] [0.002] [0.052] [0.065]
Foreign -0.001 -0.008 0.341***
[0.001] [0.026] [0.027]
PPE 0.004*** -0.677*** 0.820*** 0.003** -0.582*** 0.710***
[0.001] [0.034] [0.029] [0.001] [0.039] [0.035]
BM -0.001** -0.014 -0.121*** -0.001** -0.029** -0.121***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.017] [0.000] [0.014] [0.020]
DivDummy -0.005*** 0.004 -0.188*** -0.005*** 0.026 -0.233***
[0.002] [0.030] [0.030] [0.002] [0.037] [0.038]
Age -0.004*** -0.029 -0.219*** -0.005*** -0.040 -0.264***
[0.001] [0.021] [0.021] [0.001] [0.026] [0.027]
Q 0.003*** -0.025* 0.140*** 0.003*** 0.004 0.153***
[0.001] [0.013] [0.011] [0.001] [0.017] [0.015]
Observations 43216 27960
Adjusted/Psuedo R-squared 0.127 0.140
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y
Notes. This table presents OLS, 2SLS, and multinomial logit regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm and year levels are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though 
the coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-sample" is 
comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic operations.
Table 6. Cash Tax Savings and Efficient Investment
43216
0.0421
(2)
Multi-Logit
Full sample
(4)
Multi-Logit
27960
0.0416
Domestic-only Sample
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(1) (3)
OLS OLS
absInvestEff Under vs Normal Over vs Normal absInvestEff Under vs Normal Over vs Normal
CTS 0.002*** 0.011 0.054* 0.002*** -0.022 0.116***
[0.001] [0.026] [0.029] [0.001] [0.032] [0.039]
LowGov -0.039*** 0.041 -0.026 -0.040*** 0.064 0.041
[0.003] [0.050] [0.051] [0.003] [0.059] [0.060]
LowGov Interaction 0.008** 0.337** 0.065 0.006* 0.272* -0.015
[0.003] [0.133] [0.123] [0.003] [0.151] [0.146]
CloseShares -0.001 0.091** -0.098** -0.001 0.192*** -0.135**
[0.002] [0.042] [0.046] [0.002] [0.050] [0.057]
AQ -0.001 -0.010 0.036*** -0.002* -0.024 0.014
[0.001] [0.012] [0.012] [0.001] [0.015] [0.015]
σCFO -0.003 -0.127 0.011 -0.002 -0.029 0.182
[0.005] [0.133] [0.132] [0.005] [0.158] [0.162]
σSale 0.004** 0.153*** -0.141*** 0.003 0.114** -0.211***
[0.002] [0.044] [0.051] [0.002] [0.051] [0.061]
σInvest 0.026*** 0.197** 0.791*** 0.026*** 0.196* 0.866***
[0.004] [0.094] [0.095] [0.004] [0.114] [0.115]
Size -0.001*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.001*** -0.117*** -0.092***
[0.000] [0.007] [0.008] [0.000] [0.009] [0.009]
Overfirm -0.000 -0.038*** 0.141*** -0.000 -0.029*** 0.124***
[0.000] [0.008] [0.008] [0.000] [0.009] [0.010]
OpCycle 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Losses 0.005** 0.116*** -0.210*** 0.004** 0.144*** -0.259***
[0.002] [0.042] [0.050] [0.002] [0.052] [0.065]
Foreign -0.001 -0.009 0.342***
[0.001] [0.026] [0.027]
PPE 0.004*** -0.677*** 0.821*** 0.003** -0.587*** 0.736***
[0.001] [0.034] [0.029] [0.001] [0.039] [0.035]
BM -0.001** -0.014 -0.121*** -0.001** -0.030** -0.114***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.017] [0.000] [0.014] [0.020]
DivDummy -0.005*** 0.001 -0.189*** -0.005*** 0.022 -0.233***
[0.002] [0.030] [0.030] [0.002] [0.037] [0.038]
Age -0.004*** -0.027 -0.220*** -0.004*** -0.037 -0.260***
[0.001] [0.021] [0.021] [0.001] [0.026] [0.027]
Q 0.003*** -0.024* 0.140*** 0.003*** 0.006 0.147***
[0.001] [0.013] [0.011] [0.001] [0.017] [0.015]
Observations 43216 27911
Adjusted/Psuedo R-squared 0.127 0.143
Fixed Effects I Y I Y
Notes. This table presents OLS, 2SLS, and multinomial logit regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and 
year levels are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are 
not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-sample" is comprised of firms that have 
multinational and domestic operations.
Table 7. Use of Cash Tax Savings and Country-Level Governance
0.042
(2)
Multi-Logit
43216
Panel A: Efficient investment
(4)
Multi-Logit
Full sample Domestic-only Sample
27960
0.044
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
CashDiv Payout CashDiv Payout
CTS -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
LowGov 0.003 -0.010* -0.024*** -0.013***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
LowGov Interaction 0.005*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.004*
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
CloseShares 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.011***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
AQ 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
σCFO -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
σSale -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Size -0.000* 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
BM -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CFConst -0.050*** -0.075*** -0.059*** -0.089***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.011]
Cash 0.000 -0.032*** 0.001 -0.033***
[0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.010]
Age 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.005***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 48892 48088 24120 23764
Adjusted R-squared 0.199 0.090 0.221 0.101
Fixed Effects I Y I Y I Y I Y
Notes.  This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm and year levels are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are 
included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are 
indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-sample" is comprised of firms that have multinational and domestic 
operations.
Panel B: Dividends
Table 7. Use of Cash Tax Savings and Country-Level Governance
Full sample Domestic-only Sample
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(1) (2) (3)
CapEx Non-CapEx Intangibles
CTS 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
CloseShares 0.004 -0.010*** -0.008***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
AQ -0.001 -0.002*** -0.003***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
σCFO 0.096*** 0.011 0.044***
[0.023] [0.010] [0.014]
σSale 0.020*** -0.004 -0.006
[0.006] [0.003] [0.004]
σInvest 0.019** 0.038*** 0.021**
[0.009] [0.008] [0.010]
Size 0.002 0.003*** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Overfirm 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
OpCycle 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Losses -0.021*** -0.000 -0.018***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.006]
PPE -0.048*** -0.004** -0.008***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003]
BM -0.002** -0.001** -0.001*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
DivDummy -0.023*** -0.010*** -0.017***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Age -0.025*** -0.005*** -0.007***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Q 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.010***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 29505 29564 27450
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.168 0.135
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y
Table 8. Cash Tax Savings and Different Types of Investment  for Domestic-Only Firms
Notes. This table presents OLS regression estimations.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, 
country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are not 
reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  
*** p<0.01.
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Full sample Domestic-only Sample
(1) (2)
chgTreasStock chgTreasStock
CTS 0.000*** 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000]
Lev -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000]
CapEx -0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
σCFO -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
σSale -0.001*** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Size 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
PPE -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
BM -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
DivDummy 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Q 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 60846 41312
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.071
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y
Table 9. Uses of Cash Tax Savings: Change in Treasury Stock
Notes. This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimations. ChTreasStock  is defined as the change in 
treasury stock from year t-1  to year t, deflated by total assets in t-1 .  All other variables are as defined in 
the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models as 
indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and 
are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. The "full-sample" is comprised of firms that 
have multinational and domestic operations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Invest CashDiv Payout chgTreasStock
CSTRChg 0.212* -0.022 -0.034 0.021**
[0.116] [0.038] [0.059] [0.011]
CloseShares -0.019** 0.003 0.006
[0.008] [0.003] [0.004]
AQ -0.005 0.005** 0.008**
[0.007] [0.002] [0.003]
σCFO 0.067** -0.018** -0.005 0.001
[0.030] [0.009] [0.014] [0.003]
σSale -0.042*** -0.001 -0.006* -0.000
[0.009] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001]
σInvest 0.033*
[0.019]
Size 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002** 0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Overfirm 0.001
[0.002]
OpCycle 0.000
[0.000]
Losses 0.033
[0.028]
PPE 0.036*** -0.000
[0.006] [0.001]
BM 0.003 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.000
[0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000]
DivDummy -0.000 0.000
[0.006] [0.001]
Age -0.008** 0.002 0.004** -0.000
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000]
Q 0.023*** 0.001***
[0.002] [0.000]
Cash -0.010* -0.104***
[0.006] [0.009]
CFConst -0.142*** -0.214***
[0.010] [0.015]
Lev -0.000
[0.001]
CapEx -0.001
[0.004]
Observations 1637 1637 1637 1637
Adjusted R-squared 0.319 0.407 0.265 0.074
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Table 10. Tax Rate Shocks
Notes. This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimations.  CSTRChg  is the change in the corporate statutory 
rate from year t-1 to year t . All other variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm and year levels are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year 
fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are 
based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01.
